DDePIN Incentives Calculator Read the paper

Introduction

DePIN Incentives Calculator

The paper asks when a provider earns more by doing the required work than by deviating. A deviation can lower costs, create extra private revenue, or both. This calculator compares that gain with how much more likely the deviation is to fail a check. It then tests whether stake and probation rewards make honest work worthwhile, whether honest providers can cover their costs, and whether exiting with a new identity offers an easy escape.

01Describe the work

Enter the cost of honest work and the private gain from each deviation you tested.

02Describe the check

Enter how often providers are checked and what happens when a check fails.

03Review the result

See whether honest providers can stay and whether a new account offers an easy way out.

Use one provider, one reward period, and one consistent money unit throughout. Each input is explained when it appears.

Guided calculation

Step 1 of 4: Work and deviations

1

Step 1 of 4

Describe the work and the deviations you tested.

Choose one money unit and one reward period, then describe each profitable deviation you tested. The calculator uses the scenario that is hardest to deter.

Use USD equivalent everywhere on this page. Costs and rewards cover one provider for one reward period.

For each scenario, enter the provider's total private gain and how much more often it fails than honest work.

Compare more tested scenariosThe hardest scenario may not have the largest gain+

The calculator uses the scenario with the largest total gain relative to its detection gap.

Step 2 of 4

Tell us how often providers are checked.

Check the test results

Use the chance that one provider receives a relevant check during one reward period.

Check the assumptions behind this resultFive questions required by the model+

Confirm that providers cannot time deviations around known checks.

If a provider can avoid a cost without changing the result, the check does not cover that part of the work.

If a small cut looks the same as honest work, improve the check or accept the lower level of service.

Compare honest work with costlier or excessive service levels, not only cheaper deviations.

Add scenarios until the tests cover the worst credible combination of private gain and detection.

Consequence needed if checked every period$20.00

Scenario 1 gives the provider 2.00 USD and is 10.00% more likely to fail when checked.

A failed check must cost at least$20.00

The binding scenario gives the provider 2.00 USD. When checked every period, it fails 10.00% more often than honest work.

Step 3 of 4

Choose what the provider loses after a failed check.

This calculator uses two provider states: normal standing and probation. The consequence can come from stake taken now, a lower reward next period, or both. Its present value must cover the binding deviation's total private gain.

What happens to stake after a failed check?
A failed check takes 10.00 from the posted stake.
How does the reward change after a failed check?
The reward is reduced by 10.53. Because that reduction happens next period, its value today is 10.00.
Combined consequence after failure20.00 of 20.00 needed
Stake taken now 10.00Lower next reward 10.00Enough to remove the advantage
See a lower-cost optionOptional comparison of checks, stake, and rewards+

This comparison looks for lower routine reward and checking costs. Posted stake is shown separately because it ties up provider funds rather than becoming a normal protocol payment.

Your current design
Posted stake
10.00
Reward reduction
10.53
Expected rewards
23.50
Cost of checks
1.00
Rewards + checks
24.50
Lower-cost result
Chance of a check
100%
Posted stake
10.00
Reward reduction
10.53
Reward after failure
13.50
Rewards + checks
24.50

The search compares check rates from 1% to 100%.

Step 4 of 4

Check whether honest providers can stay.

An honest provider needs to cover its costs while in probation, even after a mistaken failure. Exiting and creating a new identity must also cost more than remaining in probation.

Can an honest provider cover its costs?

Pass
Reward while in probation$13.50This amount was set in step 3. A pass returns the provider to normal rewards.
Smallest workable reduced reward13.50

10.00 operating cost + 2.00 earnings elsewhere + 1.50 stake-related cost.

Would exiting and creating a new identity pay?

Pass
Suggested lockup: 1 periodor identity cost 0.00

Exit and re-entry cost 11.90; escaping probation is worth 10.00.

!

Result

The numbers work, but the test results need review.

Review the test questions in step 2.

Evidence needed
Check detects the binding deviationReview tests
Consequence after failureEnough
Provider covers its costsYes
Exit and re-entry paysNo
Other settingsOptional provider costs and design limits+

What this result means

A passing result means the numbers satisfy the paper's model for one normal state and one probation state. It does not prove that the check covers every real-world deviation. The result depends on the service states, provider actions, costs, and failure rates tested above.