Introduction
DePIN Incentives Calculator
The paper asks when a provider earns more by doing the required work than by deviating. A deviation can lower costs, create extra private revenue, or both. This calculator compares that gain with how much more likely the deviation is to fail a check. It then tests whether stake and probation rewards make honest work worthwhile, whether honest providers can cover their costs, and whether exiting with a new identity offers an easy escape.
Enter the cost of honest work and the private gain from each deviation you tested.
Enter how often providers are checked and what happens when a check fails.
See whether honest providers can stay and whether a new account offers an easy way out.
Use one provider, one reward period, and one consistent money unit throughout. Each input is explained when it appears.
The required work costs 10.00 USD. The binding deviation gives the provider a private gain of 2.00. Honest work fails 5.00% of checks. The deviation fails 15.00%, which is 10.00 percentage points more often.
Step 1 of 4
Describe the work and the deviations you tested.
Choose one money unit and one reward period, then describe each profitable deviation you tested. The calculator uses the scenario that is hardest to deter.
Use USD equivalent everywhere on this page. Costs and rewards cover one provider for one reward period.
For each scenario, enter the provider's total private gain and how much more often it fails than honest work.
Compare more tested scenariosThe hardest scenario may not have the largest gain+
The calculator uses the scenario with the largest total gain relative to its detection gap.
This is an estimation aid, not a formula derived in the paper. Validate it with real tests. If the proof does not check availability or retrieval, test those promises separately.
This is an estimation aid. Test cooperating groups using the real routing rules. The result does not prove that every possible group is covered.
This is an estimation aid. Compare cheaper setups with honest compute on the same requests, then use the setup with the largest gain relative to its detection gap.
Choose the largest total private gain you want the protocol to handle and the largest consequence it can impose.
Step 2 of 4
Tell us how often providers are checked.
Use the chance that one provider receives a relevant check during one reward period.
Check the assumptions behind this resultFive questions required by the model+
Confirm that providers cannot time deviations around known checks.
If a provider can avoid a cost without changing the result, the check does not cover that part of the work.
If a small cut looks the same as honest work, improve the check or accept the lower level of service.
Compare honest work with costlier or excessive service levels, not only cheaper deviations.
Add scenarios until the tests cover the worst credible combination of private gain and detection.
Scenario 1 gives the provider 2.00 USD and is 10.00% more likely to fail when checked.
If a deviation creates a 10.00 USD private gain, it must be at least 50.00 percentage points more likely to fail when checked.
This is a target for the check. It does not show that the current check meets the target.
The binding scenario gives the provider 2.00 USD. When checked every period, it fails 10.00% more often than honest work.
Step 3 of 4
Choose what the provider loses after a failed check.
This calculator uses two provider states: normal standing and probation. The consequence can come from stake taken now, a lower reward next period, or both. Its present value must cover the binding deviation's total private gain.
See a lower-cost optionOptional comparison of checks, stake, and rewards+
This comparison looks for lower routine reward and checking costs. Posted stake is shown separately because it ties up provider funds rather than becoming a normal protocol payment.
- Posted stake
- 10.00
- Reward reduction
- 10.53
- Expected rewards
- 23.50
- Cost of checks
- 1.00
- Rewards + checks
- 24.50
- Chance of a check
- 100%
- Posted stake
- 10.00
- Reward reduction
- 10.53
- Reward after failure
- 13.50
- Rewards + checks
- 24.50
The search compares check rates from 1% to 100%.
Step 4 of 4
Check whether honest providers can stay.
An honest provider needs to cover its costs while in probation, even after a mistaken failure. Exiting and creating a new identity must also cost more than remaining in probation.
Can an honest provider cover its costs?
Pass10.00 operating cost + 2.00 earnings elsewhere + 1.50 stake-related cost.
Would exiting and creating a new identity pay?
PassExit and re-entry cost 11.90; escaping probation is worth 10.00.
Result
The numbers work, but the test results need review.
Review the test questions in step 2.
Other settingsOptional provider costs and design limits+
What this result means
A passing result means the numbers satisfy the paper's model for one normal state and one probation state. It does not prove that the check covers every real-world deviation. The result depends on the service states, provider actions, costs, and failure rates tested above.